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COMMENT
THE COMING-AND-GOING RULE AND ARTICLE 8309,
SECTION 1b
by Michael M. Gibson
Since the promulgation of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1913,
controversies emanating from the "coming-and-going" rule have presented
a recurring problem. The problem is whether an employee who is injured
while going to his employment from his home or returning to his home
from his employment is within the "course of his employment" at the
time of the injury. This issue has been resolved by applying the definition
of "injury sustained in the course of employment" found in section 1 of
article 83 09.2 However, in 1957, the legislature enacted an amendment to
article 83 093 which directly affects the coming-and-going rule. The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the cases establishing the coming-andgoing rule in Texas and the exceptions thereto and also to determine the
effect of the amendment as interpreted by subsequent court decisions.
I.

COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE COMING-AND-GOING

RULE

One issue determining recovery under the Workmen's Compensation
Act is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. Such
an injury is defined by article 8309 as one "having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received
by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or
business of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere."' The courts have interpreted this language as placing a two-fold
burden of proof on the claimant-employee; that is, the employee must
prove that he was engaged in the furtherance of the affairs of his employer,
and that the injury was of the kind and character having to do with and
originating in the work or business of the employer." The employee is furthering the affairs of the employer if he is concerned with promoting the
progress of the employer's business, and not merely pursuing some personal affair." The claimant will satisfy the latter facet of the test if the in-

' TEx.
'Id.

REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-09

(1967).

art. 8309, § 1. "[I]njury sustained in the course of employment . . . shall include all

other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about the
furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or
elsewhere."
3
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, S lb (1967).
4

Id.

1.

' Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom,
365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 173, 105 S.W.2d
192 (1937).

"Maryland Cas. Co. v. Smith, 40 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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jury results from a risk or danger which is "necessarily or reasonably inherent in or incident to the conduct of the employer's business.""
Generally, an injury suffered while using the streets and highways in
going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable.8
The rationale behind this coming-and-going rule is that such an injury
is not sustained in the employee's course of employment,' because the injury is a consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the
traveling public are subject, rather than risks and hazards having to do
with and originating in the work or business of the employer."0 The
breadth of the coming-and-going rule may be illustrated by the varying
circumstances in which it has been applied: injuries sustained during the
lunch hour,1 injuries sustained while riding in a car pool," and injuries
sustained where the employee has leased his personal vehicle to his employer"' have been held noncompensable.
II.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMING-AND-GoinG RULE

Four exceptions to the coming-and-going rule have developed through
case law in Texas. These exceptions may be explained in part by the fact
that the Workmen's Compensation Act is construed liberally in favor of
the employee with a view toward accomplishing and promoting justice."
Thus, even though the employee was injured while going to or from work,
compensation has been allowed when the employer furnished the means of
transportation," the employer paid another employee to transport the injured employee," the employee undertook a special mission at the direction
of the employer,1 ' and the employee was injured while on a private means
'Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 110, 246 S.W. 72, 73 (1922).
See also Graves v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 197 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
'Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964); Jecker v. Western
Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex.
347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948); Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d
192 (1937).
'Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
1
aJanak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964); Texas Gen. Indemn. CO.
v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Meyer v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 418 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1967), aff'd, 425 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1968); Kelty v. Travelers Ins. Co., 391 S.W.2d 558
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e. One author suggests that because of speeding automobiles
the journey to and from work may be the most dangerous part of the employment and thus he
advocates that the protection of workmen's compensation should be afforded during such journeys.
Horovitz, Workmen's Compemation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41 NEB. L. REV. 1
(1961).
"Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192 (1937); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brown, 415 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
" Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964); Hackfield v. Pacific
Employer's Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref.; Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Forson, 268 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref. n.r.e.
3
" Texas Gen. Indemn. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
"4Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins.
Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d
370 (1957); Federal Sur. Co. v. Ragle, 40 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931).
"' Western Indem. Co. v. Leonard, 248 S.W. 655 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923); Employers' Reins.
Corp. v. Jones, 195 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), error ref. n.r.e.
" Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. lge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948).
T
" Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bond, 199 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), error
rel. n.r.e.; Republic Underwriters v. Warf, 103 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), error dismissed.
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of access to the employment premises."' These four exceptions to the coming-and-going rule and the article 8309 test of "injury sustained in the
course of employment" are interrelated. For example, when an employee's
injury falls within one of the exceptions to the coming-and-going rule, it
satisfies the definitional test of course of employment found in section 1 of
article 8309 and is thus compensable. 1'

TransportationFurnished by Employer. When the employer and employee
agree in the contract of employment that the employer will furnish the
employee with transportation to and from the place of work, the courts
have held that an injury sustained during the journey is within the employee's course of employment and hence compensable." For instance, in
Western Indemnity Co. v. Leonard,"' the employer was working on a federal government cost-plus contract which permitted him to include the
transportation expenses of his employees in the cost of construction. The
employer by contract furnished his employees' transportation to and from
work at no expense to them, and an employee was injured while boarding
a train furnished for such purposes. The court held that the injury was
sustained within the employee's course of employment and was therefore
compensable.
Even where no express provision is present in the employment contract,
the courts often have held that the employer impliedly furnished the
employee's transportation to and from work. This is particularly true where
the employee uses the employer's vehicle for transportation over a substantial period of time with the employer's permission or with his apparent
consent.- The courts, employing a test of control, have reasoned that the
employer could avoid extra risks by maintaining control over the vehicle
and by refusing to permit departure from direct or designated routes."
However, the control element was eliminated in 1948 when the Texas Supreme Court held that no actual c6ntrol over the details of the journey
was necessary in order for an injury, otherwise compensable, to be within
the course of employment."
'aLumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922).
"'Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948); Western Indem.
Co. v. Leonard, 248 S.W. 655 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923).
OTexas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948); Fritzmeier v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 131 Tex. 161, 114 S.W.2d 236 (1938); Western Indem. Co. v.
Leonard, 248 S.W. 655 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923); Employers' Reins. Corp. v. Jones, 195 S.W.2d
810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), error ref. n.r.e.; Fidelity Union Cas. Co. v. Hammock, 5 S.W.2d 812
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928), error ref.
" 248 S.W. 615 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923).
"Fritzmeier v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 131 Tex. 165, 114 S.W.2d 236 (1938); Fidelity
Union Cas. Co. v. Hammock, 5 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), error ref.; Jones v. Cas. Reciprocal Exch., 250 S.W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), error ref.
"Fritzmeier v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 131 Tex. 165, 114 S.W.2d 236 (1938); Republic
Underwriters v. Terrell, 126 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
"Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948). The court did
say, however, that the general power of supervision, implicit in the contract of employment, was
not relinquished.
The 1957 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act makes this control question an
exception to the coming-and-going rule. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, S lb (1967).
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Employer Pays Another To Transport the Employee. A second exception
allowing recovery for injuries sustained during travel to and from work
is illustrated by Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Inge." In that
case the employer agreed to pay one of the crewmen at a drillsite seven
cents a mile if he would use his own private automobile to transport to and
from work fellow workmen who owned no automobiles. There were no
housing facilities at the drillsite, and the crewmen had to drive a roundtrip of sixty-three miles from the nearest town where they resided. According to the Texas Supreme Court, all of these workmen were within
the course of their employment while driving to and from work under
the carpool arrangement. The court pointed out that the arrangement was
an important part of the employment contract because it provided transportation for all crew members. Moreover, the court observed that the
employer's affairs were being carried out as if the employer himself owned
the car.
The reasoning underlying this exception is that the employer's only
purpose in making such an arrangement is to enhance his business affairs
by assuring himself that all his employees have adequate transportation.
However, no court has decided whether this reasoning would be applicable
if the employer hired an independent contractor to transport his employees, none of whom owned automobiles. Seemingly, no distinction
should be made, for the primary purpose of the contract between employer
and independent contractor almost surely would be to secure the services
of the employees.
Special Mission. The special mission exception to the coming-and-going
rule includes situations in which the employee, while traveling between his
home and place of employment, undertakes a special mission at the direction of the employer or performs a service in furtherance of his employer's business with the express or implied approval of the employer." If an
injury results from street and highway risks encountered while carrying
out a special order of the employer, the injury will be compensable even
though it would otherwise be noncompensable under the coming-andgoing rule. Thus, when a foreman needs the company car for a personal
emergency and orders an employee to drive his fellow crewmen to the
drillsite in the employee's personal car, the special mission exception is applicable, and injuries suffered by the employee during the journey to the
place of employment fall within the workmen's compensation law." The
2146 Te. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948). See also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mason, 158 F.2d 244
(5th Cir. 1946).
eTexas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 352, 208 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1948).
11 The special mission exception is herein restricted to those situations where the employee is
directed to undertake a special mission while traveling between his home and place of employment.
This Comment does not treat those situations where the employee undertakes a special mission during the
normal hours of employment.
"5 Columbia Cas. Co. v. Kee, I1 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). The court held this to be
true irrespective of the fact that the employer had previously undertaken to convey the employees
to and from the drillsite as part of their compensation. The company in the past had a policy to
furnish transportation, but before the accident the employer changed his policy and furnished
transportation only after deducting fifty cents a week from each employee's salary. See also Hart-

1968]

COMMENT

fact that the injury does not occur until after the special mission has been
completed and the employee is returning to his place of employment or
continuing homeward does not affect recovery" as long as the employee
does not materially deviate from a direct route and engage in an enterprise
of his own.s However, the employee's route on the special mission must
not be so closely related to the usual and ordinary route home or to the
place of employment as to be termed only incidental to the trip. 1
Access Doctrine. The access doctrine exception to the coming-and-going
rule allows recovery where the employee is injured in an area or zone used
as a means of ingress or egress near the employer's premises."' In the first
access case to come before the Texas Supreme Court,as the injury occurred
while the employee was returning to work after having lunch at home. A
single road leading from a public street and crossing a railroad track was
the only practical way for employees to cross the track and reach their
place of employment, and the employee was killed by a train at this crossing. The supreme court held the injury compensable on the basis that the
railroad crossing bore so intimate a relationship to the employer's premises
that it could be treated only as a part of those premises. The court reasoned that if an injury occurs at a place furnished by the employer in the
interest of his business as the necessary and immediate means of access to
the employee's place of employment, and at a time when the employee is
expected or required to enter the employer's premises, the injury is the
result of a risk incident to his employment just as if he had been injured
within the actual premises and during his regular employment hours.'
These requirements of the access doctrine have been broadened by subsequent decisions. The fact that the means of access upon which the injury occurred is the only access available to the employees has been persuasive to the courts.' However, the employee need not be performing
some specific employment duty at the time of his injury; it is sufficient
ford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bond, 199 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), error ref. n.r.e.
(the court held the employee was engaged in a special mission when he was injured while driving
to his foreman's house to inform the foreman that he was unable to work that day. Neither man
had a telephone, and the foreman had told the employee to notify him if the employee was ever
unable to work); Republic Underwriters v. Wadf, 103 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), error

dismissed (a direct order by a foreman to help unload tools after other employees had been taken
home constituted a special mission and the injury sustained was compensable).
"Consolidated Underwriters v. Breedlove, 114 Tex. 172, 265 S.W. 128 (1924). (The fact that
lunch was eaten after an errand had been run did not affect the employee's status as being in the
course of employment). See also Jones v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 223 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949), error ref.; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bond, 199 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947), error ref. n.r.e.
"Jones v. Tex. Indem. Ins. Co., 223 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), error ref.; Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bond, 199 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), error ref. n.r.c.
aTravelers Ins. Co. v. Forson, 268 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref. n.r.e.; Insurors Indem. & Ins. Co. v. Lankford, 150 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
" Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922); Kelty v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 391 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e.; Viney v. Casualty
Reciprocal Exch., 82 S.W.2d 1088 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), error ref.
"Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922).
"Id. at 111, 246 S.W. at 74.
3
' Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922); Viney v.
Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 82 S.W.2d 1088 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), error ref.; Employers' Liab.
Assur. Corp. v. Light, 275 S.W. 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), error ref.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[[ Vol. 2 2

that he is engaged in activity incidental to his employment., In effect,
under the access doctrine the course of employment begins prior to the
time the actual work is entered into and before the actual business premises are reached." '
III. THE

BROADER RULE AND ITS EXCEPTION

The Broader Rule. The coming-and-going rule denies recovery for injuries
sustained while coming from or going to the place of employment. However, there is a broader rule of workmen's compensation law which denies
recovery for injuries sustained while traveling anywhere on the public
streets and highways for any purpose." The same rationale applies to both
rules: that is, the injury is not sustained in the course of employment because it is a consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the
traveling public are subject."' The coming-and-going rule is thus a part of
and involves only a restricted portion of the broader rule. Consequently,
the direct exceptions to the coming-and-going rule are also indirect exceptions to the broader rule.
The Contract Exception to the Broader Rule. The contract exception to

the broader rule provides that injuries are compensable when suffered by
employees who, by the nature of their work, are subjected to the perils
and hazards of the public streets and highways while traveling pursuant to
the requirements of their employment contract.' Deliverymen, salesmen,
truck drivers, cab drivers, messengers, collectors, and hosts of others fall
within this exception. The contract exception, however, is a direct exception to the broader rule; it does not fall within the restricted limits of
the coming-and-going rule because the injury does not necessarily occur
while the employee is traveling to or from work. Technically, for the contract exception to apply, the employee must be injured while he is performing the specific contractual duties of his employmentY
In Federal Underwriters' Exchange v. Lehers' the employer directed an
employee to pick up receipts at one of two stores owned by the employer,
and the employee was injured before he arrived at the designated store.
Even though his regular place of employment was the other store, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the employee was injured while performing
a specific duty, and thus was injured because of the nature of his work.
The court of civil appeals had also held the injury compensable, but had
done so on the theory that the employee was within the course of his em'Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 125 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error ref.;
Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Green, 11 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), error ref.
"Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, $3 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), error ref.
5
8Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
3aSee note 10 supra.
' This exception will hereinafter be referred to as the contract exception.
4 Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Lehers, 132 Tex. 140, 120 S.W.2d 791 (1938); Smith v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. $73, 105 S.W.2d 192 (1937).
42 132 Tex. 140, 120 S.W.2d 791 (1938).
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ployment because he was on a special mission,' an exception to the
coming-and-going rule. Lehers demonstrates that some facts may fit either
the "special mission" or the "contract" exception; nevertheless, the two
exceptions are distinct and independent.
IV.

THE 1957 AMENDMENT: ARTICLE

8309,

SECTION

lb

A. The Statutory Provisions
In 1957 the Texas Legislature, by amending article 8309, specifically
dealt with claims for compensation arising from injuries sustained as a
result of travel on the public streets and highways. The amendment may
be divided into two distinct portions. The first portion deals with exceptions to the coming-and-going rule and to the broader rule; the latter portion sets out the dual purpose doctrine." The "exception" portion of the
amendment is written in negative language, stating that transportation
will not be a basis for a claim that an injury was sustained in the course of
employment unless (1) the transportation was furnished by the employer
as a part of the employment contract, (2) the transportation was paid for
by the employer, (3) the means of such transportation was under the control of the employer, or (4) the employee was directed in his employment
to proceed from one place to another. Three exceptions to the coming-andgoing rule from the pre-1957 era are specifically included within section
1b,' but unlike pre-1957 law, the amendment includes the additional exception of transportation under the control of the employer. Conversely,
the access doctrine exception to the coming-and-going rule and the "contract" exception to the broader rule are not specifically covered by the
amendment.
The second portion of section lb deals with the dual purpose doctrine.
Developed by the courts prior to 1957, this doctrine applied when an
employee was injured on the streets and highways while furthering both
the employer's business objectives and the employee's personal objectives.
" Lehers v. Federal Underwriters Exch., 79 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), aff'd, 132 Tex.
140, 120 S.W.2d 791 (1938). The employee had been picking up these receipts on his way to work
for fourteen days. This fact enabled the supreme court to conclude that the employee was performing a specific duty of his employment contract.
" See note 59 infra, and accompanying text, for a discussion of the dual purpose doctrine.
Section lb of article 8309, describing in greater detail the requirements necessary to satisfy the
test of "injury sustained in the course of employment" found in S 1, reads as follows:
Unless transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment or
is paid for by the employer, or unless the means of such transportation are under
the control of the employer, or unless the employee is directed in his employment to
proceed from one place to another place, such transportation shall not be the basis
for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of such transportation is sustained in the course of employment. Travel by an employee in the furtherance of
the affairs or business of his employer shall not be the basis for a claim that an
injury occurring during the course of such travel is sustained in the course of employment, if said travel is also in furtherance of personal or private affairs of the
employee, unless the trip to the place of occurrence of said injury would have been
made even had there been no personal or private affairs of the employee to be furthered by said trip, and unless said trip would not have been made had there been
no affairs of business of the employer to be furthered by said trip.
These three exceptions are transportation furnished by the employer, transportation paid for
by the employer, and special mission.
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The mere mixing of the employee's personal matters with those of his
employer did not, as a matter of law, prevent the employee from being
within the course of employment," for as long as the employee was engaged in the employer's business, it was immaterial that he joined with this
activity some personal matter of his own." The test of recovery was whether the work of the employer had created the necessity for the travel."
The "dual purpose" portion of section lb codified this doctrine, stating
in negative language that travel for a dual purpose shall not be made the
basis for a claim that the injury was sustained in the course of employment, even though the employee was also furthering the employer's affairs,
unless the trip would have been made for the employer's business reasons
had there been no personal affairs of the employee involved, and would not
have been made had there been no business affairs of the employer involved.
This dual purpose doctrine is interrelated with the definitional test of "injury sustained in the course of employment" found in section 1 of article
8309, because if the dual purpose doctrine is satisfied, the employee is
deemed in the furtherance of his employer's affairs, and he thus satisfies
one segment of the definitional test.
B. Court Interpretation of Article 8309, Section lb
Transportation Paid for by Employer. Since the enactment of section lb
of article 8309, no case similar to Inge," where one employee was paid to
transport other employees to and from work, has been litigated. Even so,
the "paid for" exception of section lb undoubtedly includes this type of
situation. Thus, even under the statute, both the paid driver and his nonpaid passengers are within the course of employment while going to and
from work.
A similar result is not so clearly foreseeable when the employer does not
pay for all of the employee's transportation expenses. It should be noted
that in Inge the employer paid the employee seven cents a mile, which the
court said presumably reimbursed the employee for all his transportation
expenses and not just for gasoline alone. When the employer pays the employee for all his transportation expenses, the courts have concluded that
the employee is within the course of his employment.' Thus, in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Adams, 1 where the employee was reimbursed for all his transportation expenses including gasoline, a battery, and
4'Knipe v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 234 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), aff'd, 150 Tex.
315, 239 S.W.2d 1006 (1951); Associated Indem. Corp. v. Billberg, 172 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ.
App. t 1943).
i Maryland Cas. Co. v. Stewart, 164 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref. w.o.m.
aKnipe v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 234 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), affd, 150
Tem 315, 239 S.W.2d 1006 (1951); McKim v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 357
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944), error ref.
"Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948). See note 25

supra, and accompanying text.
"Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867 (1948); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Preston, 399 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r..; Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Adams, 381 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.r.e.; Shaver v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 289 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
"' 381 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.r.
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a fuel pump, the court of civil appeals held that the case fell under the
"paid for" exception of section lb.
However, when the employer agrees to pay for only the gasoline used
in the employee's personal car, a distinction apparently has been made by
the courts." In Whisenant v. Fidelity & Casualty Co." the court of civil
appeals concluded that there was no evidence that the employer paid for
the transportation at the time of the injury in spite of the fact that the
employer paid for the employee's gas and oil. The employee lived in Dallas
and each morning drove to his employer's Dallas plant. Because the employment necessitated that the employee travel between Fort Worth and
Dallas, the employer paid for the gas. The injury occurred, however, while
the employee was traveling from his home to the employer's Dallas plant.

The employer actually did pay for the gas at the time the injury was sustained, but he did so merely because it was inconvenient to require the
employee to reimburse the employer for the cost of the gas used while
traveling from the employee's home to the plant.
In Western Alliance Insurance Co. v. Jecker" the court of civil appeals
observed through dictum that even if the employer actually paid or agreed
to pay the employee for gas consumed on trips outside the employer's place
of business pursuant to requirements of his employment, this still would
not take such travel out of the general rule of no recovery. However, the

supreme court in Jecker" found it unnecessary to answer the "paid for"
exception issue because it found that the injury fell within the bounds of
the "direction" exception.
In a case decided before section lb was enacted," the court of civil appeals proceeded under the "transportation furnished by employer" exception and held that the mere furnishing by the employer of gasoline for
the employee's automobile did not constitute the "furnishing of transportation." The court reasoned that the gasoline was only incidental to the
"furnishing of transportation" and not the "means of transportation" itself. However, this reasoning is not pertinent to section lb in light of the
express "paid for" exception contained therein and in light of the holding
in Adams granting recovery even though the employee was using his own
car. A literal interpretation of section lb renders an injury compensable
when the employer pays for all the employee's transportation expenses. The
distinction apparently made by the courts when only gasoline is furnished
by the employer seems unjustified because of the liberal interpretation
given the Workmen's Compensation Act in favor of the employee."'
The Direction Exception and the Dual Purpose Doctrine. In Janak v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Association 8 the Texas Supreme Court consid52 Whisenant

v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 354 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error re.

Republic Underwriters v. Terrell, 126 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
53354 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error ref. n.r.e.
54362 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), reV'd, 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
: Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
8Republic Underwriters v. Terrell, 126 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).

" See note 14 supra.
"381

S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964).

.
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ered both the "direction" exception and the dual purpose doctrine. The
case dealt with the employee carpool arrangement, a situation commonly
arising under the coming-and-going rule." The carpool consisted of crewmen employed at an oilwell drillsite who lived in a town some miles away.
On the day of the accident, Janak was a passenger in the car driven by
another carpool member. In order to purchase ice for drinking water, the
driver had proceeded on the southerly route to the well site although the
northerly route was more direct. This deviated route was taken because no
ice was available on the more direct route and because the men left too
early in the morning to obtain it in their hometown. No water or ice was
furnished or expressly requested by the employer at the well site.
The claimant's injury occurred while the men were proceeding to work
on the deviated route; thus the court was faced with the question of
whether the passengers were within the course of their employment at the
time of the injury. The insurer contended that only the driver, if anyone,
was within the course of employment, and that Janak was merely a passenger involved in the personal business of going to work. However, the
court held that both the driver and the passengers stood in the same position because the obligation to procure ice was the obligation of all the carpool members.
The court in Janak stated that the portion of section lb dealing with
the dual purpose doctrine required an evaluation of personal and business
purposes to determine whether the employees were within the course of
their employment. The jury had answered this question in the afirmative.
In discussing this point, the court distinguished Travelers Insurance Co.
v. Forson," a case with similar facts except that the normal and direct
route to the work site was not deviated from in order to obtain ice and
water. The court of civil appeals in Forson accepted the argument that
only the driver was in the course of employment and held the injury to
the passenger noncompensable. In Janak the supreme court noted that the
Forson decision was correct because none of the employees was within the
course of employment "within sound limitations of the dual purpose"'
doctrine. Thus, the court held all the employees within the course of employment and distinguished the two cases because in Janak the carpool
took a deviated route and in Forson the normal route was never deviated
from."
"See Hackfield v. Pacific Employer's Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error
ref.; Henshaw v. Texas Employers' Ins. Aas'n, 282 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), error ref.
n.r.e.; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Forson, 268 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), error ref. n.r.e.
60268 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref. n.r.e. Even though the supreme court refused the writ of error n.r.e., the court noted that it was not satisfied that the opinion of the court
of civil appeals had in all respects "correctly declared the law" of the case.
e'Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Tex. 1964).
'This distinction was again considered in Hackfield v. Pacific Employer's Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d
720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. In this case the employee was killed on his way home from
the drillsite twenty-five miles away. The employee was a member of a carpool and at the time
of the accident there was a water can in the car which would have been filled and returned the
next morning. The ice was obtained in the mornings without any deviation from the shortest and
most direct route. The court held the death noncompensable, awkwardly reasoning that since the
employee was killed on the return trip it would seem unimportant to consider what had happened
on the trip that morning, or what would have happened the next morning except for the accident
concerning the water delivery.
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When the dual purpose portion of section lb is applied to both the deviated and nondeviated route situations, the Janak result seems logical. Recovery is allowed where a deviated route is taken because that route would
not have been taken except for business reasons and would have been
taken had there been no personal reasons. Recovery is denied where a nondeviated route is taken because that route would have been taken had
there been no business reasons and would not have been taken if no personal reasons had been present. Hence, the controlling issue is whether a
deviated route is taken to the work site for some business reason, as opposed to a personal reason.'
Because both portions of section lb must be met by the claimant," the
Janak court was faced with whether the claimant had sufficiently sustained
his burden of proof concerning the exception portion of the amendment.
To satisfy the direction exception, the employee must prove that he was
"directed in his employment to proceed from one place to another. ' " The
court stated that the direction can be express or implied," but the words
"in his employment" mean that the travel must be in the furtherance of
the business of the employer."s There can be no implied direction if the
travel is for reasons or purposes purely personal to the employee." Because
it was customary in the drilling business to transport both ice and water

to the drillsite, the court reasoned that the ice was reasonably necessary to
the furtherance of the drilling business. On this basis the court found that
the deviation to obtain the ice was impliedly directed by the employer.
The construction given the amendment in Janak supports the conclusion
that satisfaction of the exception portion of section lb also satisfies the
definitional test of section 1.6'
The Access Doctrine. Even though section lb does not deal with the access
doctrine, the result in Jecker v. Western Alliance Insurance Co.," which
included the "contract" exception to the broader rule within the "direction" exception of section lb,71 provides a strong basis for arguing that the
same result should be reached when the first access doctrine case comes
" In Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 398 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1966), an employee was required
as one of his duties as foreman of a carpenter crew to transport to and from work tools owned by
his employer and used by his crew. He had to arrive some fifteen minutes before his crew in order
to distribute the tools so the workers could start work immediately upon their arrival. The court
held the "direction" exception of section lb was not satisfied and the injury was noncompensable
because no travel was required of the employee in addition to his regular and personal transportation
to. and from work. This is analogous to Janak in that the injury was noncompensable because no
deviation was required to be made.
e4Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 398 S&W.2d 745 (Tex. 1966); Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co.,
389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965); Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964);
Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
" Trx. REv. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, 5 lb (1967).
e"Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex. 1964). See also Jecker v.
Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brown,
415 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
T
e Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex. 1964). See also Texas
Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Brown, 415 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
5
e Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964).
5
O See note 87 infra, and accompanying text.
7° 3 6 9 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
7 See note 78 infra, and accompanying text.
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before the Texas Supreme Court. To satisfy section 1b, the employee in an
access case could argue that he was impliedly directed from one place to
another, one place being just outside the zone or area furnished by the employer for ingress and egress, and the other place being the actual premises
of the employer. An alternative approach would be to contend that this
area or zone is actually a part of the premises," and thus avoid section lb
and the coming-and-going rule.
In the recent court of civil appeals case of Kelty v. Travelers Insurance
Co.," an employee was injured when she slipped on an icy sidewalk ten to
twelve feet from the rear entrance of her employer's premises. The entrance was used by both employees and the general public. Vacating the
trial court's order of summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, the court held that whether the employer was injured within the
course of her employment was a question for the jury. The court discussed
the history and development of the access doctrine in Texas and treated the
doctrine as an exception to the general coming-and-going rule, but made
no reference to section lb. In effect, the court held that the pre-1957 common law doctrine" requiring the place of access to the premises to be fur-

nished by the employer in the interest of his business also required (1)
that the employer intend that this particular place be used by his employees for such a purpose, or (2) that he either expressly or impliedly
consent to such use."' By failing to consider section 1b, the court treated
this access case as an injury occurring upon the actual premises of the employer and not as one sustained on the public streets and highways.
The legislature which enacted section lb undoubtedly had full knowledge of the access doctrine, and because this doctrine could have been included easily within the express terms of the amendment, it is possible that
the legislature intended that no compensation should be granted in such
a situation. It seems, however, that the Kelty decision will be followed in

future cases, either on the rationale that the injury was sustained by the
employee while being impliedly directed from one place to another or that
the injury was suffered while on the actual premises of the employer.
The Control Exception. In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Bottom' an
off-duty truck driver who owned a truck which he leased to his employer
was killed while driving his truck from his home to his employer's premises. The lease contract required the owner-driver to maintain his truck at
his own expense. In addition, the owner was at liberty to use his truck for
any personal reason while off duty, and it was customary for him to drive
his truck to and from work. Faced with these circumstances, the Texas Su"Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922); Kelty v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 391 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. ns.e.
73391 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. n.r.e.
t4
This doctrine was established in Lumberman's Reciprocal Assn' v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103,
246 S.W. 72 (1922).
"Lumberman's Reciprocal As'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72 (1922); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, 5) S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Civ. App. 1932), error ref.
"365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
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preme Court held that the jury finding that the employee was within the
course of employment was not supported by the evidence.
In Bottom the employee's widow argued that the facts came within the
"transportation under the control of employer" exception. A literal interpretation of the amendment could have placed the fact situation within
the control exception because the lease agreement gave the employer complete control over the truck even though the employee-driver was the
owner and was required to maintain the truck at his own expense. The
court agreed with this reasoning but still held the injury noncompensable,
concluding that if the legislature had intended to authorize compensation
when an employee is permitted to utilize for his own personal reasons a
truck controlled by the employer, the legislature would have been more
explicit. Mere gratuitous furnishing of transportation by the employer as
an accommodation to the employee and not as an integral part of the employment contract does not bring the employee under workmen's compensation."' The court reasoned that the company relinquished actual control
of the vehicle instead of exercising its full rights under the lease contract.
Thus, presently under section 1b, the employer's control of the means of
transportation seemingly constitutes an exception to the coming-andgoing rule. Control of the means of transportation has not yet been defined by the courts, but apparently there is no control over the means of
transportation unless the employer controls the details of the journey.
The Contract Exception. In Jecker v. Western Alliance Insurance Co.,"
the injured employee was a salesman of household appliances who also had
the duty of servicing any appliance sold by him within a certain time
period after its sale. The employee, who had sold an appliance in a town
eighty miles away, was killed on the return trip from a service call at the
home of the purchaser. The court ruled that the death was compensable
and that there was no personal reason for the trip even though conflicting
evidence was in the record. This decision was predicated upon the rationale
that this employee's activities should be included within the "contract" exception pertaining to travel pursuant to the express or implied requirements of the employment contract. Thus, the court concluded that the
employee was within the course of employment because the nature of his
employment subjected him to the risks and hazards of the public streets
and highways.
The Jecker court granted recovery even though section lb contains no
express provision for such a situation. Instead the court, applying the "direction" exception, reasoned that the employee was in essence impliedly directed in his employment from one place to another. The case illustrates
that section lb is applicable not only to cases involving the exceptions to
the coming-and-going rule, but also to cases concerning the pre-1957
'*contract" exception to the broader rule. In Jecker the coming-and-going
"' Oefinger v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 243 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), error ref.;
Bozart v. Federal Underwriters Exch., 159 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref. w.o.m.;
Traders' & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ratcliff, 54 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), error ref.
" 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
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rule was of no moment because the course of employment did not end
until the employee had at least reached the town of his employer's premises.
The Texas Supreme Court relied upon Jeck-er in the case of Meyer v.
Western Fire Insurance Co." There the employee was a service supervisor
for a home builder whose duties included the inspection of various homes
built by his employer. Meyer often went by his employer's office to pick
up messages, but he usually did his required paper work at his home.
Meyer had received two business calls at his home and had done some
paper work on the morning of the accident. He left his home to make
service calls in a certain subdivision, and although he was not required to
report to his employer's office, he decided to go by the office on his way to
the subdivision to determine if there were any messages relating to additional service calls near the subdivision. The accident occurred before he
reached the office. The supreme court held that there was an issue of fact
as to whether Meyer was in the course of his employment and reversed the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. The
court stated that there was evidence that Meyer was "directed in his employment to proceed from one place to another"' within the meaning of
the exception portion of section lb and the Jecker case." The court further concluded that Meyer was not precluded from recovery under the
dual purpose portion of section lb because the deviation to the office was
not for personal reasons.
The coming-and-going rule was not relevant in the case of Shelton v.
Standard Insurance Co.,"' but the problem was essentially the same. There
a truck driver en route to Wichita, Kansas, on company business stopped
for the night in Dallas, Texas. As he walked across the street from his motel to a cafe, he was struck by an automobile. The court did not consider
the exception portion of section 1b; instead, it attacked the problem on
the basis of the definitional test of course of employment under section 1.
The court determined that the employee was furthering the affairs of the
employer by stopping in Dallas for the night. Thus, the real question was
whether crossing the street to eat was so related to the employee's work
that the injuries sustained had to do with and originated in the business
of the employer. The court concluded that the facts were sufficient to
raise a jury question and reversed the trial court's summary judgment
for the insurance company.
Even though the employee in Shelton was injured while walking on the
public streets and highways, the court found that neither the broader rule
denying recovery for injuries incurred while traveling the public streets
and highways nor its "contract" exception were controlling. The court
correctly omitted consideration of section lb because the case concerned
only the definitional test of section 1.
" 425 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1968).
60TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, 5 1 (1967).

61Meyer v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1968).
2389 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1965).
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CONCLUSION

Since its enactment, every aspect of section lb of article 8309 has been

considered by the Texas courts, and with few exceptionsas every segment
has been treated in one or more Texas Supreme Court cases. The comingand-going rule, the broader rule, and the exceptions to these rules have
been included within the exception portion of section lb. Additionally,
the amendment created the control exception which did not exist via case
law, and three of the four exceptions to the coming-and-going rule are
specifically enumerated therein. The exception portion of section lb has
been interpreted to include the contract exception to the broader rule.
When the employee is injured as a result of being subjected to the risks
of the highways because of the nature of his employment, the injury is
considered as one sustained while being "directed to proceed from one
place to another." The fourth exception to the coming-and-going rule,
the access doctrine, although not specifically included in section 1b, could
be included within the "direction" exception. However, even if section lb
is interpreted to exclude the access decisions, those decisions could still be
supported on the ground that such an injury was sustained upon the
actual premises of the employer.
The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted section lb as designed not to
enlarge the definition of "injury sustained in the course of employment"
found in section 1 but to limit the probative effect given to the means of
transportation or the purpose of the journey as found in section lb."
Thus, the exceptions to the coming-and-going rule and the broader rule
are limited to those contained in section 1b, and the employee cannot recover unless one of the exceptions is satisfied.s Furthermore, the definitional test of "injury sustained in the course of employment" in section 1
and the exception portion of section lb are to be construed together just
as pre-1957 cases construed section 1 and the exceptions to the comingand-going rule and the broader rule." The satisfaction of one of the exceptions found in section lb apparently satisfies the definitional test of
section L" It is difficult to imagine a situation where the exception por"One exception not considered by the supreme court is transportation paid for by the ensployer. This exception has, however, been the subject of litigation in court of civil appeals decisions.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Preston, 399 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref. n.r.c.; Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Adams, 381 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.re.; Western
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Jecker, 362 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), rev'd, 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.
1963); Whisenant v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 354 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), error ref. n.r.e.
Another exception not yet considered by the supreme court is the transportation furnished by the
employer. The question was litigated in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Adams, 381 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964), error ref. s.r.e. and St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 341 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960), error ref. n.re.
"This reasoning was again stated in Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.
1963).
8
3)Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 398 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1966).
USee note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
SIn Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex. 1964) the court stated:
"Having thus concluded that Janak is not precluded from a recovery by the mere fact that he was
a passenger member of the carpool at the time of his injury . . . we must yet determine whether
under Section lb there is any basis in the evidence for saying that the travel to the place of injury
was in the course of his employment." In answering this question the court narrowed the question
to whether "the travel during the deviation [was] for a purpose in furtherance of the employer's
business?" See also Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 398 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. 1966) (concurring
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tion of section lb would be satisfied while at the same time the injury was
not of a kind and character that had to do with and originated in the business of the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about
the furtherance of the employer's affairs."
Like the exception portion of section 1b, the dual purpose portion does
not materially change the law. Pre-1957 cases allowed recovery when
mixed purposes were involved, but the courts applied a test based on whether the employer's business necessitated the travel." Section lb denies recovery unless the trip would have been made had there been no personal
reason, and would not have been made had there been no business reason.
The amendment seems to embody the necessity test, but it goes further
and establishes adequate guidelines for determining if business necessity
actually existed.
In addition, the dual purpose portion of section 1b, like the exception
portion, is closely related to the definitional test of "injury sustained in the
course of employment" found in section 1. In fact, satisfaction of the dual
purpose portion of the statute means that the injury was sustained while
furthering the affairs of the employer, and thus satisfies one-half of the
definitional test of injury sustained in the course of employment.

opinion); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963); Jecker v. Western Alliance ihs. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
"Tx. Rv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, S 1 (1967).
"See note 48 supra, and accompanying text.

